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Where Do We Go from Here? Reflections
on the LCO’s Consultation and
Conference
DAITHÍ MAC SÍTHIGH*
This is a report on the Law Commission of Ontario’s one-day conference on defamation
law and the Internet by the conference rapporteur. After reviewing the topical nature of the
event (including its relationship with debate on defamation law in Ontario and elsewhere),
this article discusses the position of defamation in a wider legal landscape. Points include
the relationship between defamation and privacy, the impact of data protection, and the
appropriateness of procedures. Then, the impact of technological change is assessed,
referring to the liability of intermediaries, the enforcement of decisions, and the degree
to which online communication can support a diverse range of voices and perspectives.
Concluding remarks encompass the significance of human rights law, the reconsideration of
conceptual and doctrinal frames for defamation, and the use of new technologies to address
issues of reputation and responsibility.

I.

DISCUSSING THE NEED FOR REFORM................................................................................................. 3

II.

DISCUSSING THE NEED FOR DEFAMATION.......................................................................................... 8

III.

DISCUSSING THE DIGITAL................................................................................................................... 11

IV.

THREE CONCLUDING THOUGHTS....................................................................................................... 15

*

Professor of Law and Innovation, Queen’s University Belfast.

2

(2018) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

IN THIS ARTICLE, THE READER WILL FIND SOME HIGHLIGHTS from the Law

Commission of Ontario’s (“LCO”) one-day conference, “Defamation Law on
the Internet: Where Do We Go From Here?” held in Toronto on 3 May 2018.1
The author, who presented an initial version of these observations as the final
speech of the day, neither intends to offer a definitive view nor attempts to answer
the questions upon which the Commission consulted. Instead, the goal is to
convey a sense of the debates that took place not just from the stage, but also
from the floor (though audience comments are not attributed). The event was
attended by legal practitioners, researchers, students, journalists, and members
of the general public.
The major themes are found in the program for the day, reflecting some
of the trickiest issues already outlined by the LCO in its extensive consultation
paper.2 In the morning, two panels discussed defamation reform in general and
assessed the harms and values underpinning the cause of action.3 In the afternoon,
we looked at two further aspects of defamation (intermediaries and remedies) in
more detail.4 In between, a lunchtime panel assessed a range of tricky issues in
1.

2.
3.

4.

See “Defamation Law on the Internet: Where Do We Go From Here?” (3 May 2018),
online: Law Commission of Ontario <www.lco-cdo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
LCO-Defamation-Law-Conference-Program-FINAL1.pdf> [perma.cc/6BPS-5K5T]
[“Conference Program”] (the agenda for the day). The conference was co-chaired by the Law
Commission of Ontario and Professors Jamie Cameron and Hilary Young.
Law Commission of Ontario, “Defamation in the Internet Age: Consultation Paper”
(Toronto: LCO, November 2017).
See “Conference Program,” supra note 1 at 2-3. See especially Jamie Cameron, Brian
MacLeod Rogers & Andrew Scott, “Rethinking Defamation Law: The Setting for Reform”
(Panel delivered at the Law Commission of Ontario’s Defamation Law and The Internet:
Where Do We Go From Here? conference, Toronto, 3 May 2018), online (video): LCO
<s3.amazonaws.com/peachslmvideos/pID-487/260611-1525458593-high.mp4>; Jane
Bailey, Andrew Kenyon & Randall Stephenson, “The Harms and Values Underlying
Defamation Law in the Internet Age” (Panel delivered at the Law Commission of
Ontario’s Defamation Law and the Internet: Where Do We Go From Here? conference,
Toronto, 3 May 2018), online (video): LCO <s3.amazonaws.com/peachslmvideos/
pID-487/260611-1525458593-high.mp4>.
See “Conference Program,” supra note 1 at 3-4. See especially Bram Abramson, Christina
Angelopoulos & Hilary Young, “Responsibility for Defamation and the Problem of
Intermediaries” (Panel delivered at the Law Society of Ontario’s Defamation Law and the
Internet: Where Do We Go From Here? conference, Toronto, 3 May 2018), online (video):
LCO <s3.amazonaws.com/peachslmvideos/pID-487/260611-1525458593-high.mp4>;
Ethan Katsh, Emily Laidlaw & Darin Thompson, “Resolving Online Defamation in the
Internet Age” (Panel delivered at the Law Commission of Ontario’s Defamation Law and the
Internet: Where Do We Go From Here? conference, Toronto, 3 May 2018), online (video):
LCO <s3.amazonaws.com/peachslmvideos/pID-487/260611-1525458593-high.mp4>.
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the field, with a particular emphasis on practical dimensions and experiences;
this discussion covered jurisdiction, anonymity, and voluntary removal.5 Shorter
narrative accounts of each panel were published by an excellent team of student
volunteers, who played an important role in the day’s proceedings.6
In Part I, the timeliness of the conference is considered. In Part II, we look
at the discussion on defamation within a wider legal landscape, including its
relationship with other causes of action. The importance of technological change
(or lack thereof ) is reviewed in Part III, as is the informative discussion of ‘counter
speech’ at the conference. Part IV concludes.

I. DISCUSSING THE NEED FOR REFORM
The LCO’s conference came at a crucial point in the debate on Internet
communications. Recent months have been characterized by renewed attention
being paid to the duties and responsibilities of large enterprises in the IT and
communications sectors. It was noted in an article in The Economist, even before
revelations concerning Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, that 2018 could
be the year of a regulatory and legislative “techlash,” bringing new attention to
the power exerted by the likes of Google and Amazon and whether said power
might be checked by the exercise of powers under, for instance, competition
law.7 The conference itself took place while the city of Toronto was celebrating
the documentary format by way of the twenty-fifth iteration of the Hot Docs
Festival.8 We gathered on the eve of World Press Freedom Day, a UN-led effort
to emphasize the role of the press and the importance of freedom of expression.9
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

See “Conference Program,” supra note 1 at 3. See especially Kathy English, Paul Schabas
& Maanit Zemel, “Front Line Issues” (Panel delivered at the Law Commission of
Ontario’s Defamation Law and the Internet: Where Do We Go From Here? conference,
Toronto, 3 May 2018), online (video): LCO <s3.amazonaws.com/peachslmvideos/
pID-487/260611-1525458593-high.mp4>.
Law Commission of Ontario, “Conference Blogs” (2017), online: <www.lco-cdo.org/en/
our-current-projects/defamation-law-in-the-internet-age/defamation-law-and-the-internetwhere-do-we-go-from-here/conference-blogs> [perma.cc/X5WC-GT2E].
See e.g. “Internet firms face a global techlash,” The Economist (10 August 2017), online:
<www.economist.com/international/2017/08/10/internet-firms-face-a-global-techlash>
[perma.cc/AD9S-V8U9]; “The techlash against Amazon, Facebook Google—and
what they can do,” The Economist (20 January 2018), online: <www.economist.com/
briefing/2018/01/20/the-techlash-against-amazon-facebook-and-google-and-what-theycan-do> [perma.cc/LDN9-3CEM].
See generally Hot Docs, “Welcome to Hot Docs,” online: <www.hotdocs.ca>.
See generally United Nations, “Press Freedom Day,” online: <www.un.org/en/events/
pressfreedomday>.
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The interaction between news, ‘fake news,’ and defamation—yesterday and
today, in order to understand tomorrow—was one of the themes that clearly
framed the day. Randall Stephenson’s article revisited conceptual understandings of
justifications for freedom of expression and the implications of such justifications
for defamation law, emphasizing the gap between Meiklejohn’s valorization of
self-governance and Blasi’s alternative approach of stressing the ‘checking function’
of the press (including, for instance, the recognition of information asymmetry
and accountability).10 Many speakers sought to highlight and problematize the
conceptual context of defamation law. Jamie Cameron traced the role of concepts
such as dignity, including its presentation as a justification for defamation law
(i.e., reputation) for Charter purposes in Canadian case law and how it has been
overvalued as such.11 She called attention to the need to contextualize theorizing
the problems of libel law to the Internet, citing Robert Post’s social concept of
civility as an example.12
Participants also noted the range of questions arising in courts, legislatures,
and wider debate, which offered important insights for the LCO’s reform efforts.
As Andrew Scott argued, defamation reform has a number of major modes in a
common law context: Judicial development of the law (helpfully, Brian Rogers
traced the slow development of Canadian defamation law in a Charter context
from Hill v Church of Scientology onwards) and selective or comprehensive
restatement or amendments of the law by statutory means.13 Of course, law
reform commissions can influence both, as the recent experience with privacy
law in New Zealand has shown.14
In the courts, debate pertaining to defamation law reform is framed by
a number of ongoing issues. Scott highlighted the forthcoming UK Supreme
Court hearing of Lachaux v Independent Print, where the notable provisions of
the Defamation Act 2013 on a ‘serious harm’ threshold are likely to be defined
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Randall Stephenson, “Restoring Accountability in Freedom of Expression Theory: Public
Libel Law and Radical Whig Ideology” (2019) 56 Osgoode Hall LJ 17. See also Bailey,
Kenyon & Stephenson, supra note 3.
See Cameron, Rogers & Scott, supra note 3.
Jamie Cameron, “Networking the Law of Defamation” (24 May 2018), online:
Centre for Free Expression at Ryerson University <cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2018/05/
networking-law-defamation>.
See Cameron, Rogers & Scott, supra note 3. See also Hill v Church of Scientology, [1995]
2 SCR 1130; Andrew Scott, “‘O! They Have Lived Long on the Alms-Basket of Words…’”
(2019) 56 Osgoode Hall LJ 80.
C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155 at paras 83-88. For an example of the information applied
in the case, see New Zealand Law Commission, Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies:
Review of the Law of Privacy, Stage 3, Report 113 (Wellington: NZLC, January 2010).
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more closely—especially in terms of whether the legislature intended to make a
major break with the prior law on harm.15 Noting that it had been two decades
since the landmark exploration of the relationships between jurisdiction,
defamation, and the Internet in the Australian proceedings in Dow Jones v
Gutnick, Paul Schabas discussed then-pending Supreme Court of Canada case
Haaretz.com v Goldhar, where the Court considered the application of the real
and substantial connection test to the online publication of news, restoring to
legal debate the vexed question of ‘libel tourism’ (claimants seeking the most
hospitable destination in which to initiate an action) and the reach of domestic
courts in an international communications system.16
What, then, for the legislator with an interest in the reform of defamation
law? A number of speakers drew upon the recent comments of New South Wales
judge Judith Gibson, who had written a critical account of legislative inattention
to defamation law across Australia, highlighting various inconsistencies and
intervening developments within the current law (e.g., remedies, defences, and
the growth in use of social media).17 The unfinished business of law reform is
found in Scotland, for instance, where the Scottish Law Commission has
prepared a draft Bill drawing upon the earlier reform project in England and
Wales that culminated in the Defamation Act 2013 (one of the most cited pieces
of legislation throughout the day).18 A report on similar themes, though with

15. See Cameron, Rogers & Scott, supra note 3; Lachaux v Independent Print, [2017] EWCA
Civ 1334, leave to appeal to UKSC granted (hearing set for 13 November 2018 under the
following Case ID: UKSC 2017/0175); Defamation Act 2013 (UK), c 26, s 1.
16. See English, Schabas & Zemel, supra note 5; Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick, [2002] HCA
56; Haaretz.com v Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28. In Haaretz.com v Goldhar, the Supreme Court
stayed the action on the grounds that Israel, not Ontario, was clearly the most appropriate
forum for the dispute. Interestingly, the LCO’s work is referred to in both Justice Wagner’s
concurring opinion and in the dissenting reasons by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices
Moldaver and Gascon (ibid at paras 144, 203).
17. JC Gibson, “Adapting Defamation Law Reform to Online Publication,” Gazette of Law
& Journalism (21 March 2018), online (pdf ) <glj.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/
Gibson-DCJ-defamation-law-reform.pdf> [perma.cc/NZ8Q-HX8L].
18. Scottish Law Commission, Report on Defamation, SCOT LAW COM No 248 (Edinburgh:
SLC, December 2017) (The Honourable Lord Pentland, Chairman) at 101. After the
conference, the Scottish Government announced that further consultation would take place
in advance of legislation. See also Letter from Annabelle Ewing to Lord Pentland (6 June
2018), online (pdf ): Scottish Law Commission <scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/2415/2870/8097/
Response_from_the_Scottish_Government_to_Report_on_Defamation_No_248_.pdf>
[perma.cc/5DG8-RZM8].
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distinctive recommendations, has also been prepared in Northern Ireland, though
implementation is presently unlikely due to overall political conditions.19
The European Commission has recently shown greater interest in the
selective revisiting of its legal framework for electronic commerce (through
guidance and recommendations, for now), which touches upon defamation law
through its particular concern with the liability and responsibility of Internet
intermediaries.20 Stephenson recalled Van Vechten Veeder’s 1903 critique of the
aggregation of defamation law without legislative intervention.21
In this context, it should also be noted that the conference saw a number
of important pieces of empirical and comparative evidence being presented or
referred to. Kathy English’s work in documenting requests to unpublish material
contributes to a discussion of the scope and scale of the phenomenon, especially
as the procedures for making similar requests under European law become more
widely known.22 In earlier work, Andrew Kenyon showed how a rigorous tracking
of the development of new case law after Australia’s unification of defamation
law can assist in an understanding of the effects of legal tests and defences in
the field.23 Hilary Young’s quantitative exploration of Canadian defamation cases
was also referred to by a number of speakers; findings included a higher rate of
liability in digital (i.e., email and web) cases than those occurring offline and new
insights on the award of damages across two ten-year periods.24

19. Northern Ireland, Department of Finance, Reform of Defamation Law in Northern Ireland:
Recommendations to the Department of Finance, by Andrew Scott (Belfast: Department
of Finance, 19 July 2016) (report submitted in June 2016, subsequently published with
additional consultation information under the heading “Review of the law of defamation”)
[Reform of Defamation Law in Northern Ireland].
20. European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 1.3.2018 on measures to
effectively tackle illegal content online, C(2018) 1177 (Brussels: European Commission,
1 March 2018) at 2-3.
21. Randall Stephenson, A Crisis of Democratic Accountability: Public Libel Law and the Checking
Function of the Press (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018) at 1. Stephenson makes this point in
more detail in his book, which opens with an extended discussion of Van Vechten Veeder’s
critique of defamation law. For Van Vechten Veeder’s original critique, see “The History and
Theory of the Law of Defamation” (1903) 3 Colum L Rev 546.
22. See English, Schabas & Zemel, supra note 5.
23. See Andrew Kenyon, “Six Years of Australian Uniform Defamation Law: Damages, Opinion,
and Defence Meanings” (2012) 35 UNSWLJ 31. See also Bailey, Kenyon & Stephenson,
supra note 3; Andrew Kenyon, “Defamation, Privacy and Aspects of Reputation ” (2019) 56
Osgoode Hall LJ 59 [Kenyon, “Aspects of Reputation”]
24. See Hilary Young, “The Canadian Defamation Action: An Empirical Study” (2017) 95
Can Bar Rev 591.
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Conference participants also discussed further research needs. Jane Bailey’s
work with Valery Steeves, commissioned by the LCO, made distinctive use of
focus groups as an aid to the understanding of perceptions of defamation law and
related legal remedies.25 Darin Thompson, in discussing the development of the
BC Civil Resolution Tribunal, highlighted the data that could emerge from the
new online system and how it can be reviewed both as part of an improvement
process and to highlight the use (and non-use) of the system by different types
of applicants.26 Interestingly, on the other side of the Atlantic, a key concern for
the user group established as part of the new Media and Communications List
for media and communications proceedings in the High Court of England and
Wales is the reliability of statistical information on such proceedings.27
In an introductory address, Lorne Sossin (former Dean of Osgoode Hall
Law School) recalled the establishment of the Law Commission of Ontario in
its current form and how responding to technology and digital transformations
was a key part of the case for a partnership approach and the ongoing review of
the law.28 One might also add, however, that although many troubling uses of
online communications were discussed over the course of the day, the fact that
the LCO’s own work was published online has had the more welcome result
of capturing the attention of readers well beyond Ontario. As noted above, the
reform of defamation law in England and Wales primarily worked within one
particular paradigm of revisiting the balance between the interest of claimants
and defendants; it is only now that a wider understanding of what was not done
has become clear.29 The LCO’s project is, quite rightly, already being pointed to
as a new way of reviewing defamation law.30
25. Law Commission of Ontario, Defamation Law in the Age of the Internet: Young People’s
Perspectives, by Jane Bailey & Valerie Steeves (Toronto: LCO, 15 June 2017). See also Bailey,
Kenyon & Stephenson, supra note 3.
26. Katsh, Laidlaw & Thompson, supra note 4.
27. Paul Magrath, “Media litigation: user group meeting – 15 February 2018” (16 February
2018), online: Transparency Project <www.transparencyproject.org.uk/media-litigation-usergroup-meeting-15-february-2018> [perma.cc/UD4P-YMNV].
28. Lorne Sossin, Address (Address delivered at the Law Commission of Ontario’s
Defamation Law and the Internet: Where Do We Go from Here? conference,
Toronto, 3 May 2018), online (video): LCO <s3.amazonaws.com/peachslmvideos/
pID-487/260611-1525458593-high.mp4>.
29. It was noticed by some at the time, though. See e.g. Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “Tilting
at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013” (2014) 77 Mod L Rev 87.
30. Michaela Whitbourn, “NSW pushes for historic overhaul of defamation laws,” The
Sydney Morning Herald (7 June 2018), online: <www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/
nsw-pushes-for-historic-overhaul-of-defamation-laws-20180607-p4zk0k.html>
[perma.cc/F79W-6KVV].
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II. DISCUSSING THE NEED FOR DEFAMATION
Although every project must have reasonable parameters, it has become clear that
the questions being asked by the LCO do call for debate on whether defamation
law is the right way to resolve certain issues and wrongs.
Bailey’s empirical work with Steeves, presented at the conference and, as already
noted, published in full by the LCO (which commissioned it), elicited certain
critiques of the way in which defamation law emphasizes falsity and individual
reputation, making it an imperfect fit for certain contemporary phenomena,
such as the non-consensual disclosure of intimate images.31 Moreover, as Kenyon
argues, defamation law as it stands is better described as protecting aspects of
reputation, rather than reputation itself.32 Both points also illustrate the complex
area outlined by David Mangan in another paper commissioned by the LCO,
where he observed that the development of a cause of action for privacy, while
still at a relatively early stage in Ontario, would mean that the aims of defamation,
privacy, and other causes of action ought to be spelled out in considerably more
detail.33 At the launch of the LCO’s consultation paper in November 2017, the
present author highlighted the innovative approach now being taken in New
Zealand, which is referred to in the LCO’s consultation paper.34 In New Zealand,
the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 promulgates a set of principles
regarding harmful digital communications, including, for instance, the disclosure
of sensitive personal facts or making a false allegation.35 Complaints are handled
by a prescribed complaints body (NetSafe) in the first instance, with the role
of the courts being reserved for remedies, such as correction, a right of reply,
takedown orders, and more. The Act does not repeal any aspect of defamation or
privacy law, but instead offers a new type of action without reference to existing
doctrines, albeit specific to the online context.
One particular manifestation of overlapping causes of action, which earlier
defamation reform projects have not really faced in any meaningful way, is the

31. Bailey & Steeves, supra note 25 at 40ff.
32. Kenyon, “Aspects of Reputation,” supra note 23 at 60. See also Bailey, Kenyon &
Stephenson, supra note 3.
33. David Mangan, “The Relationship Between Defamation, Breach of Privacy, and Other Legal
Claims Involving Offensive Internet Content” (Toronto: LCO, July 2017) at 56.
34. “Defamation in the Internet Age: Consultation Paper,” supra note 2 at 98.
35. Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 (NZ), 2015/63, s 6.
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increasing role played by data protection law.36 Data protection law, including
the high-profile reform instrument of the General Data Protection Regulation in
the European Union (which came into force just after the conference), identifies
principles for the processing of personal data (e.g., transparency and purpose
limitation) and requires a legal basis for processing (such as, though not limited
to, consent).37 In particular, the emphasis upon relevance supplementing accuracy
was, as pointed out from the floor by a number of participants, characteristic of
the data protection field, and so potentially controversial as a departure from the
assumptions embedded in defamation law. Scott pointed to the normalization of
resorting to data protection arguments in public figure claims against the media
in UK jurisdictions, while Kenyon recalled how Australian defamation had once
required defendants to go beyond demonstrating the truth of a statement and
identify a relevant public interest.38 Of course, as Ethan Katsh reminded us in a later
session, other areas of law, such as the control of credit reporting, were grappling
with similar issues.39 Related to these issues is the identification of the underlying
factors for defamation reform. Stephenson called for a greater understanding of
the accountability profile of a jurisdiction in order to support a discussion of
what reform of defamation law, if any, is necessary and appropriate.40 Here, in the
tradition of media and political economy scholarship identifying varying models

36. In the United Kingdom. See CG v Facebook Ireland, [2016] NICA 54 (considering the
interaction between intermediary liability and data protection, which is particularly unclear);
Pihl v Sweden App, No 74742/14 (9 March 2017). For a discussion of the availability of data
protection remedies where a defamation remedy would not be applied, see Prince Alaoui v
Elaph, [2017] EWCA Civ 29.
37. See EC, Regulation (EU) 679/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2017
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation) [2016] OJ, L 119/1.
38. See Cameron, Rogers & Scott, supra note 3; Bailey, Kenyon & Stephenson, supra note 3;
Kenyon, “Aspects of Reputation,” supra note 23 at 68. A recent example of Scott’s point is
the action taken by Cliff Richard against the BBC. See Owen Bowcott, “Coverage of Raid
on Cliff Richard’s home was in public interest, BBC tells court,” The Guardian (12 April
2018), online: <www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/12/cliff-richards-legal-battleagainst-bbc-opens-in-high-court> [perma.cc/DD25-AZWX].
39. See Katsh, Laidlaw & Thompson, supra note 4; Spokeo v Robbins (2017) 867 F (3d) 1108
(interpreting Fair Credit Reporting Act). For the Act referenced, see Fair Credit Reporting Act,
15 USC 1681 (1970).
40. Stephenson, supra note 10 at 41.
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of a media system, he highlighted both the structure of the organized media and
the presence of contextual factors (e.g., politics and public law).41
A further bundle of questions asks whether defamation procedures (including
general matters of tort law) are a good fit for the types of actions arising out of
Internet communications even if defamation is the right doctrine. This was a
major theme of the final panel of the day, though it was mentioned in every panel
by at least one speaker. Emily Laidlaw’s presentation highlighted the high volume,
low value, and legal complexity of many such actions.42 Non-pecuniary interests
are often at stake, and accessible procedures that offer speedy and digital-aware
resolution are in demand. One of the models referred to by Laidlaw in her work
is that of the emerging Civil Resolution Tribunal (“CRT”) in British Columbia.43
Thompson, a key figure in the design of the CRT, presented its main features,
speaking about the use of differing levels of automation in its online platform,
with the greater use of such for diagnostic and self-help purposes at initial stages.
What other options for procedural reform might require further discussion?
Rogers highlighted two important developments in the courts: the greater use of
summary procedures and the growth in the number of cases between individuals,
compared to the more conventional type of defamation action between, for
instance, a well-known figure and a media corporation. As Katsh put it, recalling
Roger Fisher and William Ury’s Getting to Yes, conflict is a growth industry.44
Maanit Zemel added that in a context where anonymity is widespread, various
assumptions around the orderly progress of litigation, the use of interim orders,
and the like become considerably more complicated and may, in some cases,
make resolution impractical.45

III. DISCUSSING THE DIGITAL
41. See Bailey, Kenyon & Stephenson, supra note 3. For an example of this tradition, see Daniel
C Hallin & Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
42. Katsh, Laidlaw & Thompson, supra note 4. See also Emily Laidlaw, “Re-Imagining
Resolution of Online Defamation Disputes” (2019) 56 Osgoode Hall LJ 162.
43. See Civil Resolution Tribunal, “Welcome to the Civil Resolution Tribunal” (2018), online:
<www.civilresolutionbc.ca>.
44. See Katsh, Laidlaw & Thompson, supra note 4; Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes:
Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, revised ed by Roger Fisher, William Ury & Bruce
Patton (New York: Penguin Books, 2011).
45. See English, Schabas & Zemel, supra note 5.
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The co-chairs of the event both framed the technological dimension of the
day’s proceedings in helpful ways. Young explained how the problems being
discussed were highlighted, rather than created, by the Internet, while Cameron
pointed to the nature of online community, the opportunities for novel forms
of accountability, and the challenges of manageability, legitimacy, and reach.46
This online aspect is indeed a distinctive feature of the LCO’s project. Other
recent reform initiatives, such as those in England and Wales, were, as Scott
set out, informed by concern about the chilling effect of defamation law and
the overall balance between the parties, rather than a high-level concern with
the implications of technological and related social change. In this section, the
debates on intermediary liability, de-indexing, dispute resolution, and counter
speech will be highlighted.
As with dispute resolution, the question of the role of intermediaries was
both the subject of a specific panel and a theme of the discussions during other
panels. It was clear that the debate was moving to a more advanced stage.
Christina Angelopoulos, who presented work she and Stijn Smet previously
published on the continuum of approaches to intermediary liability across the
world, emphasized that the question was not a simple choice between liability
and immunity.47 Instead, the question was which of a great number of models
to choose or adapt, including the ‘notice and notice’ system known to Canadian
audiences from copyright law, the new system developed for England and Wales
in section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 (effectively interpolating a waiting
period into notice and takedown and distinguishing between anonymous and
non-anonymous contributions), and more.48 Bailey highlighted the emergence
of transparency as a key concern within the discussion of intermediaries.49 Bram
Abramson made reference to the Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability,
which were developed by free speech and digital rights organizations and highlight
a number of process issues, such as accountability and clarity.50

46. See Abramson, Angelopoulos & Young, supra note 4; Cameron, Rogers &
Scott, supra note 3.
47. See Abramson, Angelopoulos & Young, supra note 4; Christina Angelopoulos & Sitjn Smet,
“Notice-and-Fair-Balance: How to Reach a Compromise Between Fundamental Rights in
European Intermediary Liability” (2016) 8 J Media L 266.
48. See Abramson, Angelopoulous & Young, supra note 4; Defamation Act 2013, supra note 15,
s 5. See e.g. Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012 c 20, ss 41.25-41.27.
49. See Bailey, Kenyon & Stephenson, supra note 3.
50. See Abramson, Angelopoulos & Young, supra note 4; Electric Frontier Foundation, “Manila
Principles on Intermediary Liability,” online: <www.manilaprinciples.org>.
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Laidlaw and Young set out to present a new model of intermediary liability
for defamation law, discussed at the conference by Young and set out in more
detail in this issue.51 The key obligation would be to pass a complainant’s notice
to the author of the content in question. A response (in justification) from
an author would mean that the content remains available, but the obligation
(punishable by a fine rather than the imposition of liability) would be to disable
access to the content in the event of no response. This idea also links to the
discussions of the nature of defamation law, as in Part II (above). The proposal
here owes more to administrative or regulatory law than to the conventional
private law model of defamation.
Two defining aspects of reform, as Zemel argued in an earlier panel, would
be the degree to which key players would ‘buy in’ to change and, as a number of
speakers said, whether statutory reform could create incentives for intermediaries,
and indeed others, to act in a particular way.52 In the famed Leveson Inquiry
into press behaviour and standards in the UK, and indeed the earlier defamation
reform project in the Republic of Ireland, we saw considerable discussion of how
to incentivize cooperation with regulatory mechanisms (e.g., the Irish statutory
version of the Reynolds defence calls for participation (or non-participation) in a
Press Council to be taken into account).53
In the meantime, a new role is emerging for a certain type of intermediary—
search engines. Schabas reflected upon the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
in Google v Equustek, where long-established equitable powers were deployed in
an industrial property case in an attempt to prevent Internet users from accessing
infringing material through the search engine.54 This case has clear resonances of
the European debate on the “right to be forgotten,” or ‘de-indexing,’ especially
the application of the then-Data Protection Directive to search results in the
decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Google Spain SL v
Spain (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos).55 Mention was also made of the
51. Emily Laidlaw & Hilary Young, “Internet Intermediary Liability in Defamation” (2019) 56
Osgoode Hall LJ 112.
52. See English, Schabas & Zemel, supra note 5.
53. See UK, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Leveson Inquiry - Report into the
culture, practices and ethics of the press, by Lord Justice Leveson, (London: The Stationery
Office, 29 November 2012); Defamation Act 2009 (Republic of Ireland), s 26(2).
54. See English, Schabas & Zemel, supra note 5; Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC
34 (applying British Columbia’s Law and Equity Act). For the legislation applied, see Law
and Equity Act, RSBC 1996, c 253, s 39.
55. Google Spain SL v Spain (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos), C-131/12,
[2014] ECR 317.
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very recent application of such in UK jurisdictions.56 English noted how even
though the doctrine was at an early stage in Canada, it was already shaping the
strategy (and, in particular, the language) of interactions between dissatisfied
parties and the press. Schabas, in turn, highlighted the debate on whether a right
of this nature was already found within Canadian privacy legislation.57
Laidlaw’s discussion of online dispute resolution also considered the
opportunities of technology as part of libel reform, referring to features such as
the enforceability of decisions, which was a major feature of the eBay ecosystem
(and associated attention to reputation). Katsh, a pioneer in the field, presented
reflections on the development of eBay’s system and other models.58 There was
an intriguing discussion on the link between intermediary liability and the future
of dispute resolution concerning not just the role that intermediaries could play
in general, but also the possibility of using the contractual relationship between
users and intermediaries as a means for ensuring, or at least making, engagement
with a dispute resolution mechanism more likely.59
It was clear, even from the first panel (where each speaker touched upon
the point in one way or another), that counter speech is an aspect of defamation
law in the Internet age that provokes a range of reactions and ideas. The LCO’s
consultation paper set out a number of questions regarding remedies such as
correction and takedown orders. Indeed, the idea of remedies also formed a facet
of defamation law reform in other jurisdictions, leading to provisions such as
section 30 of the Defamation Act 2009 in Ireland (allowing a court order requiring
a defendant to publish a correction in specific form and content) and section 13

56. See e.g. NT1 v Google LLC, [2018] EWHC 799 (QB); Townsend v Google Inc,
[2017] NIQB 81.
57. The question of the application of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act, in particular section 4 and Schedule 1, to the operation of online search
engines and to requests to de-index is considered in the Office of the Privacy Commissioner
for Canada’s “Draft OPC Position on Online Reputation.” Issues include whether search
engines act in the course of commercial activities, whether journalistic/literary exemptions
are available, the effect of the principle of accuracy, the assessment of the public interest,
and the territorial scope of action. See Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Canada,
“Draft OPC Position on Online Reputation” (26 January 2018), online: <www.priv.
gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/consultation-on-online-reputation/
pos_or_201801> [perma.cc/LU74-7FPJ]. See also Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5, s 4, Schedule 1.
58. See Katsh, Laidlaw & Thompson, supra note 4; Ethan Katsh & Orna Rabinovich-Einy,
Digital Justice: Technology and the Internet of Disputes (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017).
59. See Laidlaw, supra note 42 at 188-93, 195-96.
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of the Defamation Act 2013 for England and Wales (allowing a court order to
remove a statement or cease distribution).
Scott set out the debate on corrective information, including the feasibility
of a right of reply.60 This debate is indeed an area with a checkered history.
Right of reply requirements have faced constitutional difficulties under US law,
although such requirements have become more prevalent in Europe, as they form
one of the coordinated aspects of broadcasting law in the European Union (i.e.,
there is no EU-wide system, but each member state must reflect the principle of
right of reply in its law).61 Some members of the audience, though, highlighted
existing imbalances in power and the disparate impact of harmful speech as
possible reasons why even a strong iteration of counter speech, court-ordered or
otherwise, would fail to provide adequate redress for some complainants. Scott
also points to the recommendations he made in the Northern Ireland review
that would replace the existing approach to ‘single meaning’ (the court’s role in
identifying the meaning of a statement before assessing its defamatory nature and
any applicable defences) with clear incentives to correct meaning at an early stage
through clarificatory text.62
Is the Internet a particular space where, as Kenyon wondered, more speech
would be a more feasible response than earlier forms of communication? This
point was taken up and developed in English’s discussion of unpublishing in the
context of news archives and, in particular, the merits of adding subsequently
disclosed or determined information, rather than deleting, by way of retraction,
an earlier report or aspect thereof.63 Again, discussion here began to touch upon
the nature of online communication in a time that is said to have seen the
impact of ‘fake news.’ Recent empirical work has considered the speed at which
60. See Cameron, Rogers & Scott, supra note 3. For Scott’s published work on the matter, see
Mullis & Scott, supra note 29 at 107-108.
61. See e.g. Miami Herald Pub Co v Tornillo, 418 US 241 (1974); EC, Directive 2010/13/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning
the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), [2010] OJ,
L 95/1, art 28(1) (“any natural or legal person, regardless of nationality, whose legitimate
interests, in particular reputation and good name, have been damaged by an assertion of
incorrect facts in a television programme must have a right of reply or equivalent remedies”).
62. See Cameron, Rogers & Scott, supra note 3; Reform of Defamation Law in Northern
Ireland, supra note 19.
63. See English, Schabas & Zemel, supra note 5. For greater detail, see Kathy English, “The
longtail of news: To unpublish or not to unpublish” (October 2009), online (pdf ): Associated
Press Media Editors <www.apme.com/resource/resmgr/online_journalism_credibility/
long_tail_report.pdf> [perma.cc/FE5U-6KZT].
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reports spread and the varying role played by humans and automated systems in
disseminating true and false information.64

IV. THREE CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In launching its consultation paper in November 2017, the LCO noted its
desire to investigate “whether or how defamation law should be reformed in
light of fast-moving and far-reaching developments in law, technology and social
values.”65 What role did the conference of May 2018 play in this process? The
present report has only summarized a number of the discussions, but it may be
useful to make three brief observations by way of a conclusion.
First, although the merits of freedom of expression were outlined and
emphasized in various contexts, it is quite clear that the debates of the day took
place with full awareness of a range of fundamental rights. There was reasonable
disagreement about the scope and significance of reputation (a matter that has
also provoked varying responses in, for instance, the European Court of Human
Rights’ interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights), but the
discussions—like the LCO’s review itself—placed communication and expression
in a broad social context.
Second, in common with a broader trend in media law in the Commonwealth,
and indeed the European Union, defamation law was situated within the world of
media and Internet law. Important points were made on the differences between
conventional media defendants and others and on the capacity and particular
features of tort law. However, participants chose liberally from conceptual
frames and case studies across the worlds of public and private law and tried to
think about the best legal fit (substantively, doctrinally, and procedurally) for
problems and harms.
Finally, participants certainly began to explore whether the answers to
defamation law in the Internet age might relate to the Internet itself. As one
might expect, there was little time wasted on proclaiming that technology would
solve all problems. Nonetheless, speakers worked through a range of models that
64. See e.g. Soroush Vosough, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News
Online” (2018) 359 Science 1146 at 1150 (notably finding that while bots speed up the
distribution of news without reference to truth and falsity, responsibility for the rapid spread
of ‘fake news’ is more likely to lie with human users).
65. “Defamation Law and the Internet: Where Do We Go From Here?” (last visited 18 October
2018), online: Law Commission of Ontario <www.lco-cdo.org/en/our-current-projects/
defamation-law-in-the-internet-age/defamation-law-and-the-internet-where-do-we-go-fromhere> [perma.cc/6YSV-CKEK].
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would co-opt certain relevant features—systems of identity and trust, means of
enforcement, the capacity to carry additional information—and also picked up
the theme, which the LCO’s team knows well, of the shift towards social media.
Much of the earlier wave of Internet-related defamation reform assumed certain
types of intermediaries and authors; today’s answers may distribute rights and
responsibilities a little differently.
One does not envy the LCO’s researchers in trying to make sense of this
volume of comments and ideas. It is, however, a tribute to the far-reaching
nature of its consultation paper (and the associated commissioned papers),
and its work should inform reviews of defamation—and media—law well
beyond the province.

